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Prediction Analysis and Developmental Priority:
A Comment on Froman and Hubert
David Moshman

Department of Educational Psychology, University of Nebraska–Lincoln
Froman and Hubert (1980) have attempted to show how recently developed prediction analysis techniques may be applied to issues of developmental priority, that is, to clarifying the interrelationship
between two developing concepts. Although this work is in some respects an important advance over
earlier statistical techniques, it seems to raise new problems: (a) It goes too far in identifying issues
of developmental priority (sequence vs. synchrony) with issues of statistical relationship (dependence
vs. independence) and thus (b) unjustifiably fails to consider certain information inherent in the data
which, although irrelevant to issues of statistical relationship, is highly relevant to issues of developmental priority. The present application of prediction analysis techniques to questions of developmental priority thus raises new difficulties at least as serious as those it resolves.

In an interesting recent article, Froman
and Hubert (1980) considered the application
of prediction analysis techniques developed
by Hildebrand, Laing, and Rosenthal (1977)
to issues involving the developmental priority
of concepts. These statistical techniques and
their application by Froman and Hubert are
particularly noteworthy in that they are not
limited simply to deciding between sequence
(one concept develops before another) and synchrony (two concepts emerge simultaneously)
but rather can deal with more complex patterns of interrelationship of the sort discussed
by Flavell (1971), Moshman (1977), Wohlwill
(1973), and others. The purpose of this article
is to suggest a serious problem that should be
taken into account in the further development
of prediction analysis and its applications to
issues of developmental priority.
Consider a very simple case in which we
simply assess the presence or absence of each
of two concepts in a sample of subjects. Table 1 presents some hypothetical data discussed by Froman and Hubert (1980, p.138).

The data in Table 1 indicate that the majority
of those (34) subjects who showed exactly one
of the two concepts showed B only (32) rather
than A only (2). As Froman and Hubert noted,
various simple statistical techniques for testing developmental priority confirm this observation, thus supporting the conclusion that B
generally develops before A. (One might even
suggest an invariant sequence here if one is
willing to attribute the two discrepant cases
to measurement error.)
Froman and Hubert argued, however, that
any such conclusion would be an obvious mistake, since the data were specifically setup to
reflect total independence of the two concepts
(i.e., each cell frequency equals the expected
frequency derivable from the marginal totals,
given an assumption of independence). They
then go on to present a prediction procedure
that essentially overcomes this problem by
comparing the various cell frequencies not directly with each other but with expected frequencies based on the marginals and an assumption of independence.
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Table 1
Hypothetical Frequency Distribution for Two
Concepts
Concept A
Concept B 		
Absent
Present
Total

Absent

Present

8
32
40

2
8
10

Total
10
40
50

Though this new procedure initially sounds
reasonable, it suffers from a serious confusion
of developmental priority (sequence vs. synchrony) with statistical relationship (independence vs. dependence). Paradoxical as it may
seem, statistical independence does not rule
out developmental priority, and the present
hypothetical data are a clear example of this.
With respect to independence, the relatively
large number of subjects in the B-only cell (32)
can be dismissed as an artifact of the unequal
marginals and thus does not count as contrary evidence. With respect to developmental
priority, however, an appeal to the marginals
will not do, since the marginals themselves
reflect developmental priority: The majority of
subjects show B (see row totals) but only a minority show A (see column totals), suggesting
a tendency for B to develop first in the population of which the present subjects constitute a
sample. Any analysis of cell frequencies which
“corrects” for these marginals is correcting for
actual evidence of developmental priority and
thus reduces the probability of reaching the
appropriate conclusion.
The importance of this problem is illustrated in Froman and Hubert’s discussion of
my (1977) data. Froman and Hubert maintained on the basis of a detailed prediction
analysis that the Common Sense I (CSI)
model provides at least as good a fit for the
data as the consolidation (C) model that I find
more convincing. Intuitively, their conclusion
is surprising, since the two models differ only
with respect to a single cell (see their Figure
5, p. 144); the actual number of subjects falling in that cell is quite small, conforming to
the prediction of the C model. Froman and
Hubert (1980) argued, however, that their
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analysis avoids the statistical traps that have
ensnared others:
In particular, significant differences between off-diagonal cells is insufficient for
the establishment of developmental priority, since any statement on a temporal order
of acquisition must account for the cell frequencies that are expected under statistical
independence,(p. 145)

Thus the apparent support for the C model is
seen as an artifact of the unequal marginal
totals. The problem with their conclusion is
that the C and CSI models actually make different predictions about the marginal totals
themselves. For example, it is clear from Froman and Hubert’s Figure 5 (p. 144) that the
C model (but not the CSI model) predicts that
for each of the two sections in their Table 3
(p. 144), the marginal total for the second row
exceeds the marginal total for the second column (reflecting the underlying prediction of C
theory that subjects remain transitional longer on the negated version of each task). It is
thus not surprising that after “correcting” for
marginal totals that support the C model, the
support of the data for that model is considerably attenuated.
Though there seems to be a serious problem with the prediction analysis approach,
the present critique should not be construed
as suggesting that the earlier approaches Froman and Hubert criticized were unproblematical. In fact, at a deeper theoretical level,
Froman and Hubert may well be on the right
track. Clearly, our ultimate goal in research
on developmental priority is not to establish a
static cross-classificational picture but rather
to better understand the intricate causal dynamics linking the development of various
concepts. Thus we need to consider the directional or reciprocal dependence of the concepts under consideration. However, the prediction analysis approach seems to get at
issues of dependence only at the expense of ignoring orthogonal issues of developmental priority. Moreover, statistical dependence is relevant here only to the extent that it reflects
an underlying causal-developmental dependence, and in the absence of longitudinal and
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experimental data, this is a difficult thing to
judge. Unless prediction analysis can be further developed to deal with these issues, its
application to questions of developmental priority raises new difficulties at least as serious
as those it resolves.
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